

Activities of Intelligence Services as a Synonymous of Fear and Intimidation

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Abstract

Intelligence services are an important factor of national security. Their main role is to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information on threats to the state and its population.

Because of their “dark” activity, intelligence services for many ordinary citizens are synonymous of violence, fear and intimidation. This mostly comes out in the Republic of Kosovo, due to the murderous activities of the Serbian secret service in the past. Therefore, we will treat the work of intelligence services in democratic conditions, so that the reader can understand what is legitimate and legal of these services.

In different countries of the world, security challenges continue to evolve and progress every day, and to fulfil these challenges, the state needs new ways of coordinating and developing the capability to shape the national security environment. However, the increase of intelligence in many countries has raised debates about legal and ethical issues regarding intelligence activities.

Therefore, this paper will include a clear explanation of the term, meaning, process, transparency and secrecy, and the role that intelligence services have in analyzing potential threats to national security.

The study is based on a wide range of print and electronic literature, including academic and scientific literature, and

other documents of various intelligence agencies of developed countries.

Key Words: intelligence services, intelligence, national security

1. Introduction

The term *intelligence* refers to the collection, analysis, production and use of information about states, groups, individuals, or potentially dangerous activities (Collins, p.314).

Espionage and prostitution openly and scientifically are known as the oldest professions in the world. Because of their activity maybe everybody hates them, but thanks to the work of intelligence services and espionage, many battles and wars are won. Laquer (1985) argues that espionage, together with the prostitution, are the oldest and most problematic professions in the world. Often, two figures - prostitutes and spies - matching or swapping roles and garments, create even more confusion.

The existence of intelligence services in democratic countries gives rise to a political paradox. On the one hand, the services are established in order to protect the state, citizens and other persons under the state's jurisdiction, as well as the democratic order; so they are given special powers and capabilities for this purpose. They are usually entitled by legislation to acquire confidential information through surveillance, interception of communication, and other methods that infringe the right of privacy; to undertake covert operations aimed at countering threats to national security; and to operate with a high level of secrecy. On the other hand, the intelligence services and members of the executive can abuse these powers and capabilities to undermine the security of individuals and subvert the democratic process. They can violate human rights in contravention of the law, interfere in lawful political activities, and favour or prejudice a political party or leader. They can intimidate the opponents of government, create a climate of fear, and fabricate or manipulate intelligence in order to influence government decision-making and public opinion. They can also abuse intelligence funds and methods for personal gain (Nathan, 2012, p.49).

Many people, while watching Hollywood movies, feel and are convinced that the intelligence services employees perform various operations and military police characters. But, what the reader needs to know and understand is that intelligence services in democratic conditions

are not executive institutions. *Information service* name, itself makes us understand that it comes to an institution that provides informative character for the government of their country, but always based in the interest of national security strategies and national security.

Intelligence services may have different areas of specialization. For example, the state's intelligence services, also known as security services, provide intelligence relevant to the internal security of a country and the maintenance of public order. They are usually tasked with the collection of information on those who may threaten the security of the state through espionage, political violence, terrorism or clandestine activities directed by foreign governments. In contrast, foreign intelligence services provide intelligence relevant to the external security of a country and the prediction of threats coming from outside (Mellon, 2006, p.2).

In the broadest sense, intelligence and information operations comprise the organization (apparatus) which performs this activity. The notion of intelligence, in material meaning includes information activities and goals that are achieved with this activity, while a meaning in organizational-formal sense - organization and the means by which the organization performs the function. Historically, intelligence in a material sense was born earlier than intelligence as specialized organization. As the activity with a specific purpose, it was born with the appearance of the political class society, and as an organization specializing in middle age class, mainly in the period of absolute monarchy and in terms of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Intelligence function makes this institution as specific. This in particular is conditional with tasks, scope and methods of its activity. The more general task of intelligence is to collect data and to inform about the opponent's secrets. For this, the object of intelligence service is the secrecy in specific as a social phenomenon, conditioned by the discord, clashes and wars in the interests of a society (Abazović, 2006, p.50-51).

2. Intelligence service activities

To talk about intelligence service activities, this first require a definition. Because intelligence means many things to many people, boiling it down to one single definition is difficult. Common usage seems to embrace two definitions, which are sometimes used interchangeably. For most people intelligence is "information for decisionmakers." This is broad in scope and

includes all manner of decisionmakers, from business people to sports coaches to policymakers. For others, though, intelligence is "secret state activity designed to understand or influence foreign entities" (Treverton et al., 2006, p.10).

Strictly speaking, intelligence activities involve solely the collection and analysis of information and its transformation into intelligence. But other activities like counterintelligence and covert action have come to be considered examples of intelligence activity. Counterintelligence is the acquisition of information or activity designed to neutralize hostile intelligence services. These activities might involve espionage against those services, debriefing of defectors, and analysis of the methods of hostile operation. They might also involve penetration and disruption of hostile services and their activities. In some states intelligence services (especially if they are military) are also involved in covert action. Covert action can be defined as any operation or activity (including use of violence) designed to influence foreign governments, persons, or events in support of the sponsoring government's foreign policy objectives while keeping the sponsoring government's support of the operation a secret (DCAF, 2002, p.2).

But, since the first day when people began to gather information on the strengths and goals of neighbouring clans and ethnic groups, have existed spies and art, or science of espionage. And since the beginning of the collection and analysis of information, have existed criticism regarding their usefulness and effectiveness (Musci and Minicangeli, p.9).

As we have stated in the abstract of this paper, many world famous services dealt with activities that are illegal and outside the scope of intelligence. Given the experience and suffering of the Albanian people in Kosovo in the past, once the name is *intelligence service*, ordinary people automatically think of as a synonymous of fear and intimidation.

Thoroughly starting from the past until today, the Serbian secret service had a special approach and activities in relation to Kosovo. They had a key word during the Serb occupation nearly a century, and for Kosovo this costs very expensive, thus being always a terrible laboratory experiments that experienced our people (Bruqi, 2007).

What the reader should be clear is difference between legal and illegal. The activities which we stated above, have been completely illegal activities and in violation of democratic principles and professional intelligence. Similar actions, where intelligence officers have been involved in various

illegal activities, are best shown in the infamous services like Russian KGB¹ and Mossad of Israel.

One of the fundamental principles of democratic governance is the accountability of state institutions before voters. Furthermore, because intelligence services use public funds, the public has a right to know if those funds are used properly, legally, effectively and efficiently. Given the confidential nature of intelligence work; intelligence services cannot be completely transparent; so, the citizens must create an alternative mechanism (except public scrutiny) to monitor the behaviour of intelligent services on behalf of constituents. The most common mechanisms are parliamentary committees and expert oversight bodies created by Parliament in fulfilling its obligation to ensure the existence of checks and balances to control all government agencies (Born and Wills, 2012, p.18).

Intelligence services are not supposed to do police or military work (such as arresting people or launching assaults on military opponents). Secondly, they need not to harass, threaten or injure people - these actions are illegal and intelligence officers, as government employees, must respect the laws of their country, the rights and privacy of fellow men (Mellon, 2006, p.3). To have a clear view of what we are saying, there is another intelligence discipline that plays a vital role in homeland security, from our smallest rural community, to our largest cities, across the state, regional, and even national boundaries. That intelligence discipline is "criminal intelligence" (Chesbro, 2010, p.56). We will not talk here about this, because it's a completely different dimension of intelligence. Gerringer and Bart (2015) noted that law enforcement agencies regularly use their intelligence to support investigations and contribute to prosecutions. The critical difference between investigations and intelligence is that investigations are retrospective and focus on an event that has occurred, while intelligence is prospective and attempts to predict likely future events. Investigations produce evidence that can be used for prosecutions. Intelligence produces judgments based on an incomplete picture of the future. Evidence from investigations must be made public under our system of jurisprudence. To do so with intelligence would negate its value.

The Article 3 of the Law on Kosovo Intelligence Agency (now on referred as KIA), says that the KIA has no executive functions and has no

¹ The KGB was a Russian Secret Service, formed in 1954 and was governed by laws and regulations of army.

right to use direct or indirect force, any power of arrest, the possibility of initiating criminal proceedings, and power to compel persons or companies to cooperate with them, though persons or companies may cooperate with the KIA on a voluntary basis (Republic of Kosovo, Law on Kosovo Intelligence Agency, 2008, p.3).

As noted by Goldman (2013), in order to teach about intelligence and ethics it is important to remember three things:

1. Ethics are not the same as the law;
2. The ethics of intelligence work are not necessarily synonymous with a person's personal ethics; and
3. Given its fundamental mission, working in the intelligence community should be considered ethical.

The sources and methods of espionage, the goals and tactics of covert action, and the professional conduct of intelligence officers are matters typically hidden from public scrutiny, yet clearly worthy of public debate and philosophical attention. Recent academic studies of intelligence that have had any intentional bearing on ethics or political philosophy have largely focused on procedural questions surrounding the proper degree of oversight of intelligence agencies. But what is often missed in such examinations is substantive ethical analysis of intelligence operations themselves. In some essays written by former Central Intelligence Agency (now on referred as CIA) officers, it has been suggested that the peculiar nature of the knowledge and expertise of intelligence professionals relative to grave external threats requires an extraordinary or specialized morality (Perry, 1995, p.1). For example, according to Dulles (2007b), CIA - is not an illegal organization, but a completely legal institution and, to create an accurate image of it, of what it deals with, we must read the law - Act on National Security, 1947. Of course it has secret supplements, which allow the National Security Council and, in the final analysis, and the president, to submit other duties of the intelligence, other than those mentioned in the law. But, CIA - is by no means the only government body, where secrecy plays an important role. Regarding to their activities, the State Department and the Defence Ministry also oversee maximum secrecy.

According to Nathan (2012), it should also be stressed at the outset that excessive secrecy gives rise to suspicion and fear of the intelligence organizations, reducing public support for them. In a democracy, unlike a police state, intelligence agencies must rely on public cooperation rather

than coercion and terror, in order for them to be successful. The provision of greater information about the services would raise their profile in a positive way, reduce the apprehension and fears induced by secrecy, improve cooperation with the services, and thereby boost their effectiveness.

By intelligence definition itself, explicitly setting out the need for such a kind of organizational model with internal structure and hierarchical levels, which would answer the needs and requirements of government policy. However, no matter how many authors depicting common elements in the organizational structure in vertical and horizontal lines, the fact remains that it is difficult to research the phenomenon mentioned. So, we may never see the inside of all the elements and internal organizational structures of intelligence, because the secret nature of the work absolutely does not allow it. If so, then there could be no talk about their secret work (Maslesha, 2005, p.96-97).

Wheaton and Beerbower (2006) noted that the purpose of intelligence is perhaps the most difficult aspect of intelligence definition. What should decision-makers expect intelligence to do? One thing is clear: intelligence is more than information. Decision-makers may appreciate a well-written description of a problem, but they will certainly expect more. Decision-makers want intelligence to tell them something that is based on fact but allows them to plan for the future with a reasonable expectation of success. Decision-makers would, of course, prefer certainty regarding the future but are unlikely to expect it. Instead, the intelligence professional's purpose should be to reduce the decision-maker's level of uncertainty to the minimum possible.

2.1 Transparency and secrecy

Secrecy creates an artificial scarcity of information; by its definition, a secret is a piece of asymmetric information. An information asymmetry arises between parties, one of whom has access to information to which another has no access. Information asymmetries are thus a source of power (Curtin, cited in Hubbard, 2005, p.9). The delegation of public power to agents naturally involves information asymmetries. Assuming the state is run by economically (and bureaucratically) self-interested actors, information asymmetries give rise to 'rent-seeking' behaviour. But information asymmetry between government and citizen limits democratic participation and accountability; removing information asymmetries allows

for meaningful popular participation and oversight of government (Stiglitz, cited in Hubbard, 2005, p.9).

In *Necessary Secrets*, Gabriel Schoenfeld argues that secrecy in governmental affairs is “an essential prerequisite of selfgovernance.”³ “and,” he continues, “when one turns to the most fundamental business of democratic governance, namely, self-preservation—carried out through conduct of foreign policy and the waging of war—the imperative of secrecy becomes critical, often a matter of survival.”⁴ Indeed, he maintains, “even in times of peace, the formulation of foreign and defence policies is necessarily conducted in secret” (Schoenfeld, cited in Friedman and Hansen, 2012, p.1611).

Although trans-governmental networks generally lack transparency as compared to other institutions, intelligence sharing networks operate with the highest levels of secrecy. The very structures through which agencies share information are among the intelligence community’s top secrets. Even where the existence of such networks has been revealed, the essential elements—the participants, methods of operation, and agreements themselves—remain classified (Sepper, p.156-157).

The conflict between secrecy, a necessary condition for intelligence, and openness, a necessary condition for performance improvement, was a recurring theme that Johnston (2005) observed during his research. Any organization that requires secrecy to perform its duties will struggle with and often reject openness, even at the expense of efficacy. Despite this, and to their credit, a number of small groups within the Intelligence Community have tasked themselves with creating formal and informal ties with the nation’s academic, non-profit, and industrial communities. In addition, there has been an appreciable increase in the use of alternative analyses and open-source materials.

For the purpose of this study, we will also provide a working definition for fear. In short words, we can define fear as a *lack of security* about a particular issue.

For example, results of a survey conducted by the Macedonian Center for European Education (QMEE), noted that a high number of Macedonian residents, 63.6% believe that the intelligence agencies intercept inter-human communications of people who they consider as opponents, against 16.3% who do not believe that this happens, and 20.1% of residents remain neutral on this issue. The perception of the existence of fear in society increases among educated persons. Almost two-thirds of people with

higher education think that residents of Macedonia do not speak in public, because of fear (Lajmpress, no date). Meanwhile, another survey conducted by the writers' organization PEN American Centre has found that a large majority of its members are deeply concerned about recent revelations regarding the extent of government surveillance of email and phone records, with more than a quarter saying that they have avoided, or are seriously considering avoiding, controversial topics at their workplace (Cohen, 2013).

A top United Nations human rights official released a report that blasts the United States' mass surveillance programs for potentially violating human rights on a worldwide scale. Digital communications are vulnerable to electronic surveillance and interception – and it has become evident that new technologies are being developed covertly to facilitate these practices, with chilling efficiency, Pillay said during a press conference on Wednesday announcing the report's publication. She then added (Pillay, cited in Sankin, 2014):

“International human rights law provides a clear and universal framework for the promotion and protection of the right to privacy, including in the context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance, the interception of digital communications and the collection of personal data. Practices in many [s]tates have, however, revealed a lack of adequate national legislation and/or enforcement, weak procedural safeguards, and ineffective oversight. All of these have contributed to a lack of accountability for arbitrary or unlawful interference in the right to privacy.”

In a democratic state, human rights can be violated for the public interest or the protection of other interests of the state, but the violation must not touch the essence of the law and the standards of a democratic state. I think that these violations should be done only by law, and not with other governmental acts.

The free society must also have confidence that its oversight mechanisms have adequate access to secret material to make judgments, and that this judgmental process is being exercised independently. There has to be trust that secrecy is not being used against the best interests of the free society; that the activities which are being protected by secrecy are being conducted effectively; and that necessary readjustment of these activities takes place in conformance with changed domestic and

international circumstances. It is this confidence and this trust in the oversight mechanisms which has broken down. In exploring the means by which confidence and trust can be restored, the free society must bear in mind the fact that its consensus does change. The lessons of the past must not be ignored, but it would be an error to judge what was formerly done – or what might be done in the future – by a consensus of the current moment deprived of historical perspective. It would also be mistaken to concentrate too much on preventing the abuse of secrecy without also recognizing that there are legitimate secrets. The free society owes it to those it holds responsible for producing secret information and conducting secret activities to maintain an oversight process which protects legitimate secrecy (Knott, 1994).

3. Internal and external intelligence service in democratic states

Every state has internal and external intelligence service. The mission of internal intelligence is to gather information relevant to national security. National or internal security is the protection and preservation of the state, territory, sovereignty and society against various acts of terrorism and organized crime in general. While Foreign Service mission is to obtain information and evaluation of important safety information and warnings external. Foreign Service can provide important information regarding the intentions, capabilities and activities of foreign organizations or individuals that present a potential or actual threat to the internal interests of the state.

3.1 USA

United States has a complex system of security and intelligence agencies. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC) and is the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) for intelligence matters related to national security. Also, the Director oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. The President appoints the DNI and the Principal Deputy Director with the advice and consent of the Senate (FAS, 2009).

In this part, we will only talk about internal intelligence service - Federal Bureau of Investigation (now on referred as FBI) and external service - CIA.

In the framework of its powers and scope, the FBI, as the most important component of the discovery of the Ministry of Justice, today conducts its own investigation into more than 250 types of criminal offenses that are within the competence of federal bodies. So, the FBI along federal laws examines the activities that are considered national priorities. Here belong counter-intelligence activities, the fight against organized crime, terrorism, drugs and other forms of criminal activities. The FBI is the central institution of anti-reconnaissance, whose responsibility is to convey, interrupt and reveal the goals and activities of foreign intelligence services in the territory of the US (Maslesha, 2005, p.220-221).

CIA's primary mission is to collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the President and senior US government policymakers in making decisions relating to national security (CIA, no date).

3.2 United Kingdom

The core institutions of British intelligence have proven resilient. They have survived withering criticism following spectacular failures and have weathered economic boom and bust. This is due to several factors: the legacy of intelligence support for policy making during the Second World War; the Cold War and the Soviet nuclear threat; the centrality of intelligence to the Anglo-American relationship - valued and nurtured by British politicians from Churchill to Tony Blair; the importance of good intelligence in the small wars of the end of empire; and because of the consistent threat the United Kingdom has faced from terrorists. Britain has fought very hard to maintain its intelligence power, even as other aspects of its global influence diminished (Dylan and Goodman, 2014, p.3). Main intelligence agencies of UK are Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) known as MI6 (foreign intelligence), and Security Service known as MI5 (internal intelligence).

The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), often known as MI6, collects Britain's foreign intelligence. SIS collects secret intelligence and mounts covert operations overseas in support of British Government objectives. The parameters for these activities are laid down in the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which states that SIS functions are to obtain and provide information and perform other tasks relating to the acts and intentions of persons overseas (Secret Intelligence Service MI6, no date):

- In the interests of national security, with particular reference to the government's defence and foreign policies;
- In the interests of the economic well-being of the UK; and
- In support of the prevention or detection of serious crime.

On the other hand, The Security Service is responsible for protecting the UK against threats to national security from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers, and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means (Security Service MI5, no date).

3.3 Germany

In Germany, BfV (*Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution*) plays an indispensable role in protecting the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany. Its task is to avert all efforts meant to harm the country, the free democratic basic order, and the population. To this end, the BfV collects and analyses information about extremist, terrorist, and any other efforts posing a threat to security, and about foreign intelligence services' activities directed against the country. The predominant purpose of collating all gathered information is to keep the Federal Government informed about the security situation (Germany, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, no date). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) works closely with its counterparts at state level and with the other German intelligence services (the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD)) as necessary. The BfV is an executive agency of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. It has about 2,750 staff. To carry out its tasks, the BfV may use clandestine methods as allowed by law, including surveillance, false documents and vehicle number plates, front companies, etc. It may also gather information from financial institutions, airlines and Internet service providers in accordance with the relevant law. Under certain conditions and with the approval of a special Bundestag body known as the G 10 Commission, the BfV may conduct telecommunications surveillance. But the federal and state offices to protect the Constitution may not generally spy on individuals or collect personal information, for example concerning unusual personal behaviour. Nor are extreme political opinions grounds for surveillance (Germany, Federal Ministry of the Interior, no date).

BND (*Federal Intelligence Service*) uses intelligence resources of its disposal to collect information unobtainable by any other means. This information contributes to foreign and security policy decision-making at national level and helps to protect German interests all over the world (Bundesnachrichtendienst, no date). This is subordinated to the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Intelligence Service.

3.4 France

France internal security is the responsibility of two large police forces: national security forces, which are under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Gendarmerie, which is the military police under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

DST (*Directorate of Territorial Surveillance*) is responsible for internal security of France and is under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. DST collects processes and analyzes intelligence data and designs overall strategy for national security.

French Defence Ministry accommodates DGSE (*General Directorate for External Security*) and DRM (*Directorate of Military Intelligence*). The DGSE is a state Service under the direct authority of the executive power and operates within a very strict legal and deontological framework. The DGSE's activities, defined by the Political Authorities, are exclusively tasked to protect French interests. Its activities particularly contribute to protecting French citizens anywhere in the world (France, Ministry of Defence, no date). For its part, the DRM, which reports to the Chief of Defence Staff, has the mission to meet his intelligence requirements of "military interest" (*renseignement d'intérêt militaire*, a notion coined in 1992) and those of the military's operational and organic commands. It is responsible for centralizing, analyzing, exploiting and disseminating military intelligence among the authorities and bodies concerned. DRM is committed on all overseas theatres of operations in support of French forces (Hayez and Regnault de Maulmin, 2014, p.4).

4. The Intelligence Cycle

If a secret service intends to obtain data not only on the number of rival armed forces and their equipment, but also on their plans and goals, not enough to hide behind the thorns; full information cannot be provided even with the use of air or cosmic intelligence. We must go into enemy

base, the strict sense of the word and to clarify things from the inside, in other to obtain important plans and documents (Dulles, 2007a, p.15).

The branches of the intelligence services have been extremely effective while operating in different countries using multiple forms of intelligence.

The intelligence process, also called intelligence cycle, begins with the national security and foreign policy officials who want to know something about global states or other actors involved in world affairs, whose actions may affect the safety of their state (Collins, no date, 320).

The intelligence cycle begins to those who request, and returns back to the requester. To be information accurate and reliable, it should be converted to intelligence, which must go through the following filters.

4.1 Planning

Planning and direction by a competent authority is the starting point of the intelligence cycle and normally comes in the form of duties by the highest levels of state.

Planning is forecast and the drafting of the set of measures with legal, professional and logistics, with the aim of achieving the goals and concrete objectives for the collection of necessary information (Republic of Albania, no date).

4.2 Collection

Gathering information can be done overtly (openly) and covertly (secretly). Reading foreign newspapers and magazine articles, listening to foreign radio, and watching overseas television broadcasts are examples of "overt" (or open) sources for us. Other information sources can be "covert" (or secret), such as information collected with listening devices and hidden cameras. We can even use space-age technology like satellite photography (CIA, no date).

Intelligence gathering used open source (OSINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and other methods in use of intelligence services. Although the activities of intelligence services use various sources of data collection, we will talk briefly about those regarded as most important.

Open source intelligence - OSINT, refers to information that is publicly available and other information that have limited distribution or public access, for example: internet, electronic and printed media, books, newspapers, etc.

Human intelligence – HUMINT, from its name makes us understand that it is gathering information on contact with different people or different citizens, in other words through interpersonal contacts.

Signals intelligence – SIGINT, refers to the collection of information through signals such as personal electronic devices (mobile phones, tablet PC, smart phones), computers, radios, Wi-Fi, etc.

Imagery intelligence – IMINT, is intelligence gathered through the use of visual pictures, lasers, radar, infrared sensors and electro-optics.

4.3 Analysis-Production

The heart of the intelligence cycle is the analysis phase, where the task is to bring insight to the information that has been collected and processed. The method is straightforward: hire qualified people to sift through all the available information in an attempt to predict what events may happen next in the world (Johnson, 2006, p.120).

Analysis is arguably the most important part of the intelligence process. It is the means by which Analysis of the information gathered and processed from a variety of sources is pulled together and developed into a usable product to help decision-makers address the issues of the day. In some systems, different agencies will be focused on one primary means of collection (e.g. in the UK, the SIS is a HUMINT-focused organisation, whilst GCHQ works exclusively on SIGINT), relying on other organisations in the structure to undertake the analysis of their processed material. In others, such as the US, different agencies will undertake the entire collection, processing, analysis and dissemination process within their own structures; this is known as competitive analysis, with each agency undertaking its own analysis of an issue, on the basis that this approach will make the overall analysis stronger and is therefore more likely to provide decision makers with the most accurate intelligence (Hannah, O'Brien and Rathmell, 2005, p.5).

This is the stage when the raw data are converted into a usable format. The information provided by the intelligence signals are translated, human intelligence reports are formatted and added as sources of information, and intelligence of images is converted to customer specifications.

4.4 Dissemination

In this final step, intelligence service gives final written analysis to a policymaker, the same policymaker who started the cycle. After reading the final analysis and learning the answer to the original question, the policymaker may come back with more questions. Then the whole process starts over again (CIA, no date).

5. Conclusion

The nature of work itself of intelligence services has to do with collection and analyzing information. Such measures require a high degree of confidence. On the other side, there is a danger that such information can be misused for internal political purposes, which can also pose a threat to society and political system which must protect. For this reason it is very necessary to exercise clear democratic and parliamentary control on them. Only a system of checks and balances can prevent the executive authorities or parliament in misuse of intelligence for political purposes.

In a democratic society, intelligence services must be effective, politically neutral, adhere to professional ethics and act in accordance with its legal mandate, constitutional and legal norms, and democratic practices of the state.

Transparency and intelligence secrets are two important elements. An intelligence as it should be transparent, so there must be a secret. Transparency is necessary for democratic governance, protecting human rights and preventing the abuse of power. On the other hand, secrecy must be exceptional. This is because the secrets must be important, because their disclosure would cause serious damage of human life, intelligence, national security, and the state itself.

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